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MONETARY POLICY TRANSPARENCY AND PASS-THROUGH OF RETAIL 
INTEREST RATES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the degree of pass-through and adjustment speed of retail 
interest rates in response to changes in benchmark wholesale rates in New 
Zealand during the period 1994 to 2004. We consider the effect of policy 
transparency and financial structure in the transmission mechanism. New 
Zealand is the first OECD country to adopt a formal inflation targeting regime with 
specific accountability and transparency provisions. Policy transparency was 
further enhanced by a shift from quantity (settlement cash) to price (interest rate) 
operating targets in 1999. We find complete long-term pass-through for some but 
not all retail rates. Our results also show that the introduction of the Official Cash 
Rate (OCR) increased the pass-through of floating and deposit rates but not fixed 
mortgage rates. Overall, our results confirm that monetary policy rate has more 
influence on short-term interest rates and that increased transparency has 
lowered instrument volatility and enhanced the efficacy of policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Monetary policy is the primary tool of macroeconomic management in nearly all 
industrialized countries. When monetary policy needs to be tightened (loosened), 
the central bank or monetary authority will increase (decrease) the official interest 
rate, banks and other types of financial institutions will follow suit by raising 
(reducing) their deposit and lending rates. Faced with higher (lower) cost of 
funds, consumers and companies will adjust their consumption and expenditure 
accordingly, thus affecting output and inflation. The efficacy of monetary policy 
thus depends on how fast and to what extent financial institutions pass through 
changes in the official rate to their customers. 
 
While there are numerous studies on monetary policy transmission, the 
retail interest rates pass-through process is relatively under-explored, at least 
until recently.  Most of the studies on the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy assume immediate and complete pass-through of changes in official rates 
to retail bank rates (for example, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and 
Stein, 2000; Altunbas et al, 2002). Recent studies show that the pass-through 
may be incomplete and that the adjustment speed may be sluggish. The pass-
through and adjustment speed also differ across financial institutions and across 
financial products, which implies that the speed of monetary transmission varies 
across different segments of the banking sector. Further, some studies also find 
that the adjustment speed is different depending on whether rates are above or 
below their long-term equilibrium level (Chong et al, 2005; Kleimeier and Sander, 
2005). 
 
In this study, we examine the degree of pass-through and adjustment 
speed of retail interest rates when benchmark interest rates change in New 
Zealand. Specifically, we analyze the following issues: Firstly, we consider the 
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long-term pass-through of the official rate and interbank rate to various retail 
interest rates such as deposit and lending rates including the base lending rate 
and mortgage rates of different maturities. We employ the Phillips-Loretan (1991) 
methodology which eliminates asymptotic bias problems and allows for 
meaningful statistical inferences on the long-run coefficients.  By incorporating 
the effect of dynamics in the data generation process (DGP), this method also 
accounts explicitly for the role of past policy surprises and future expected policy 
settings in the relationship between retail rates and policy instruments. Secondly, 
we examine the short-term pass-through and the adjustment speed of retail 
interest rates using an error correction model and also test whether the 
adjustment speed is symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, we investigate whether a 
change in monetary policy operating procedures and increased transparency of 
monetary policy as a result of the adoption of the Official Cash Rate (OCR) 
instrument in 1999 has had a different effect on the pass-through and adjustment 
speed of interest rates in New Zealand.  
 
There are at least three reasons why a study of the New Zealand 
transmission mechanism is important. Firstly, New Zealand is the first country to 
adopt an explicit inflation targeting regime with specific accountability and 
transparency provisions. These arrangements became a prototype model for the 
policy frameworks adopted by other OECD countries and more recently a 
number of developing countries. Secondly, unlike most other countries,  there 
was a major shift in the monetary control mechanism in New Zealand during this 
period away from quantity targets (settlement cash balances) and towards price 
based (OCR) settings. Although under either of these two regimes the 
transmission of monetary policy would operate primarily through interest rates, 
the question is whether and to what extent there will be a change in the degree 
and adjustment speed of pass-through from policy instruments to retail rates and 
by implication to the effectiveness of monetary control. We would expect that 
under a price regime the role of interest rates in the transmission mechanism will 
become much more transparent. Settlement cash balances, unlike interest rates 
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(and exchange rates), do not normally have a stable relationship with nominal 
income or inflation and generally lead to considerably higher interest rate volatility 
compared to an interest rate target. Quantity targets do, however, offer certain 
operating advantages as they provide a better cushion against accommodating 
unintentionally inflationary increases as is often the case under an interest rate 
targeting regime. They also facilitate a rapid interest rate response which may be 
crucial during periods of high or renewed inflationary pressures (see Spencer, 
1992).  
 
The third reason relates to the observation that New Zealand is one of the 
most heavily indebted OECD countries and its household sector has negative 
savings rate. The banking sector, almost all foreign owned, relies more and more 
on overseas borrowing. It would be interesting to see the effectiveness of 
monetary policy when there are leakages in the system.  According to official 
statistics by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, as of March 2005, the private 
sector’s foreign debt was NZ$149 billion, or 101 percent of New Zealand’s GDP, 
which is 8.8 times more than the government’s overseas debt (NZ$17 billion, or 
12 percent of GDP). While the business sector has increased their savings due to 
higher profits, the household savings have been declining steadily. The New 
Zealand household sector has one of the lowest savings rates among the OECD 
countries. According to Statistics New Zealand, households in New Zealand on 
average do not save anything out of current income but, instead, “dis-save” about 
12 percent of income per year. Residential mortgage debt accounts for 90 
percent of the total household debt which in turn accounts for over 50 percent of 
the total loan portfolio of all New Zealand’s financial institutions.i  As a result of 
the shortage of local savings, banks in New Zealand have been increasingly 
borrowing wholesale funds from overseas markets to meet the strong demand for 
mortgages, which may have some impact on the relationship between OCR and 
fixed-rate mortgages.   
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Our findings show that the long-term pass-through of market interest rates 
to various retail rates differs across financial products. Some rates show 
complete pass-through while others do not. The short-term pass-through and 
adjustment speed also differ across products. We find no evidence that banks in 
New Zealand adjust their rates (both lending and deposit rates) up more slowly 
than they adjust them down. The introduction of OCR has increased the long-
term pass-through of floating and fixed deposit rates, but had no impact on the 
other rates. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides 
some institutional background on New Zealand monetary policy. Section 3 
provides the conceptual framework and the literature review. Section 4 outlines 
our methodology. Section 5 discusses the data and results and the final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. MONETARY POLICY IN  NEW ZEALAND 
 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), New Zealand’s central bank, is 
responsible for operating monetary policy independently to achieve price stability 
which is defined in the Policy Targets Agreement (PTA). The PTA is a specific 
and public contract negotiated between the Governor of the Reserve Bank and 
the Minister of Finance on behalf of the Government. It is an important 
component of the monetary policy framework as set out in the 1989 Reserve 
Bank Act. The current PTA, signed in September 2002, requires the Reserve 
Bank to keep inflation as measured by annual increase of CPI between 1 and 3 
percent on average over the medium term.  
 
In the 1990 and 1993 PTAs, price stability was defined to be 0 to 2 percent 
inflation over a one year period. The target band was widened to 0 to 3 percent in 
the December 1996 PTA. As inflation had actually been outside the target range 
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on the upper side for nearly two years at that point and never below 1 percent, 
the new target band in essence did not represent a major shift in regime. 
However, pressing difficulties to keep inflation within the target band forced the 
Reserve Bank at the time to make a major shift in policy setting.  
 
Previously, the Bank had set policy so as to avoid moving outside the 
target range a year ahead. It had made that judgment largely on the basis of the 
direct transmission effect from foreign prices through the exchange rate onto 
inflation (see Huang, Margaritis and Mayes, 2001). This in effect amounted to 
setting exchange rate bands as an intermediate target. Thereafter the Bank 
aimed to bring inflation info the middle of the target range 6 to 8 quarters ahead. 
This difference in both adopting a longer policy horizon and aiming towards the 
middle of the band represented a substantial change in the way policy was set. 
From July 1997 to March 1999, the RBNZ used a Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI) as a means of communicating its monetary policy requirements. Since 
March 1999, the RBNZ has changed its principal instrument of policy from 
managing the quantity of overnight cash to setting the interest rate for it (OCR). 
This rate is reviewed eight times a year.ii  
 
Unlike most countries New Zealand did not set an interest rate as such 
prior to 1999. Instead the RBNZ influenced market conditions by specifying 90-
day bank bill rates that would be consistent with price stability – initially in 
combination with a range for the exchange rate and from late 1996 in terms of a 
Monetary Conditions Index that combined the two in a single measure. Although 
it could achieve any given market rate by use of quantitative controls in the 
overnight market – it set a ‘cash target’ for its daily market operations – the Bank 
did not normally have to use that weapon to achieve the market conditions it 
wanted. The combination of the threat that it could act and the statements 
explaining what was required were normally sufficient means of achieving its 
policy objectives.  
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The Bank thus set policy through what have often been described as 
‘Open Mouth Operations’ (Guthrie and Wright, 2000). Normally the quarterly 
Monetary Policy Statements were the vehicle used but in between times if there 
were shocks or the market moved too far the Governor or other senior members 
of the Bank would issue a brief statement saying what the Bank wanted. 
Unanticipated changes were infrequent and typically the Bank’s settings will 
sanction market movements. By changing to an OCR setting the Bank adopted a 
more conventional Cash Rate instead of the quantitative target. 
 
The OCR system is simpler and can be easily understood.iii It operates as 
follows:  when an OCR is announced, the Reserve Bank is prepared to pay 
financial institutions an interest rate 0.25 percentage points below the OCR for 
their deposits with the Reserve Bank and is also prepared to lend overnight cash 
to banks against good security at an interest rate of 25 basis points above the 
OCR. More importantly, there is no limit on the amount of cash that it is willing to 
take in or let out at 25 basis points below and above the OCR, respectively. As 
the central bank acts as a market-maker in the short-term money market without 
any limits imposed on the amount traded, no commercial bank is likely to offer 
short-term loans at a rate significantly higher than the OCR. In a competitive 
financial system, other banks would undercut that by borrowing money from the 
Reserve Bank. Similarly, a financial institution is unlikely to lend short-term at 
much lower than the OCR since it can lend to the Reserve Bank at the OCR 
level, without any credit risk at all. 
 
By lending or borrowing overnight money in unlimited volumes, the 
Reserve Bank is able to maintain the short-term interbank interest rate at the 
Bank's OCR level. By setting the OCR, the Reserve Bank can substantially affect 
other types of short-term interest rates, e.g., the 90-day bill rate, floating 
mortgages, etc. The OCR can also influence other retail interest rates 
administered by commercial banks and other types of financial institutions. As a 
result, changes in OCR will influence the overall level of economic activity in the 
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country and hence inflation. However, this process takes time and the pace of 
adjustment speed varies across products and over time. 
 
III. RIGIDITIES IN THE INTEREST RATE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
 
The adjustment of retail interest rates by financial institutions to changes in 
monetary policy rate or benchmark money market interest rates is not 
spontaneous and the pass-through may be incomplete. In the industrial 
organization literature, a similar phenomenon in the goods market is known as 
price rigidity. The rigidity in the interest rate adjustment process is due to a 
number of factors that include fixed menu costs, high switching costs, imperfect 
competition and asymmetric information.  
 
Under the menu costs hypothesis, banks are reluctant to change their 
interest rates if the changes of the benchmark interest rates are very small and/or 
temporary in nature (see Dutta et al., 1999).  As there are adjustment costs 
involved in changing retail interest rates to bank customers, banks may respond 
slowly to temporary changes in monetary policy rate, but quickly to more 
permanent changes in policy rates.  
 
Under the switching cost hypothesis, customers are unlikely to switch 
financial products and/or institutions in search of better funding or investment 
terms when there are high switching costs (see Heffernan, 1997). Customers 
need to spend time and effort to find out which bank offers the best deal and may 
find it too inconvenient and/or too costly to switch banks. For example, in the 
case of prepayment of loans and early withdrawal of time deposits by customers, 
some banks may charge a fee to make it costly for the customers to exercise 
those embedded options. The rigidity in interest rates may thus be attributed to 
the banks’ exploitation of consumers’ inertia in switching financial products and/or 
institutions. If banks can selectively price their products to exploit customers’ 
inertia, then rates are expected to be rigid upwards for customer deposits, but 
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downwards for loans. In other words, banks may adjust their deposit rate 
upwards more slowly and adjust their loan rate downwards more slowly. This will 
lead to asymmetry in the adjustment speed in interest rates.  
 
Under the imperfect competition hypothesis, because of the collusive price 
arrangement among banks, rate adjustments in uncompetitive markets can be 
asymmetric, i.e., deposit rates are expected to be rigid upwards, while loan rates 
are expected to be rigid downwards (see Hannan and Berger, 1991, Neuman 
and Sharpe, 1992).  
 
Finally, according to the asymmetric information hypothesis, banks face 
both adverse selection and moral hazard problems when they are required to 
raise loan rates in response to rising market interest rates (see Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). The presence of agency costs makes banks more reluctant to 
increase loan rates significantly over a short period of time. Higher loan rates 
make loan payments more difficult for borrowers, leading to more problem loans 
and defaults. Unless their margins are under pressure and market rates are 
expected to remain high, banks are reluctant to raise loan rates. Instead, banks 
are more likely to ration the amount of credit extended to borrowers when there is 
an upward pressure on loan rates. As a result, loan rates are expected to be 
more rigid upwards under the asymmetric information model.   
 
A combination of the above factors may play a different role in the retail 
interest rates’ short-term and long-term adjustment process.  Switching cost and 
menu costs, for example, are more likely to be the primary factors in influencing 
the short-term adjustment speed whereas imperfect competition and asymmetric 
information are more likely to be the primary factors in affecting the long-term 
pass-through (see Bondt, 2002). 
 
Thus it becomes an empirical question as to whether the deposit rates and 
loan rates are more rigid upwards or downwards.  Furthermore, it is also likely for 
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the rigidity in retail interest rates to vary across different financial products. For 
example, such differences may be observed for loan rates versus deposits rates, 
floating mortgages versus fixed rate mortgages, short-term versus long-term 
rates, depending on the relative level of customers’ inertia or the importance of 
switching costs.  Customer inertia, for example, may be greater on saving deposit 
than on time deposits.   
 
Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neuman and Sharpe (1992) were the first 
to study the stickiness of deposit rates. While assuming complete and immediate 
pass-through for retail lending rates, they examined the impact of market power 
in the deposit market on the stickiness of deposit rates in the United States. They 
found asymmetric adjustment in the deposit rate, i.e., banks adjust their deposit 
rates upwards more slowly than they adjust them downwards and they attributed 
it to banks’ market power in the deposit market. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) 
were the first to study the pass-through to retail lending rates. Using an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model, they examined the response of 
lending rates in both developed and developing countries to changes in market 
interest rates. They found that interest rate pass-through differs across countries 
and that loan rate stickiness can be reduced by several factors: the existence of 
a market for short-term negotiable instrument, lower money market interest rate 
volatility, and relatively weak barrier to entry/competition.   
  
Paisley (1994) and Heffernan (1997) examined the relationship between 
market rates and retail rates in the UK.  Whilst Paisley (1994) did not find 
complete pass-thorough in mortgage rates for British building societies, 
Heffernan (1997) found complete pass-through in repayment mortgages but 
incomplete pass-through for current and savings accounts of British banks and 
building societies.  Hofmann and Mizen (2004) studied 13 deposit and mortgage 
products of individual British financial institutions using a non-linear model and 
found complete pass-through for deposit rates but not for mortgage rates.   
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Mojon (2000) examined the short-term pass-through to lending and 
deposit rates in five Euro-area countries, (Belgium, Germany, France, 
Netherlands and Spain), assuming there is full pass-through in the long term. He 
found that retail interest rates respond sluggishly to changes in money market 
rates; long-term rates respond more slowly than short-term rates, and there is an 
asymmetry in the degree of pass-through. Pass-through to lending rates is higher 
when market rates are increasing than when they are decreasing, but the 
opposite is true for deposit rates. Bondt (2002) examined the relationship 
between government bond yields and deposit and lending rates on a matched-
maturity basis for the Euro area as a whole. He found that pass-through is 
complete for most lending rates, but it is incomplete on impact for both deposit 
and lending rates. Kleimeier and Sander (2005) examined the pass-through in 
the euro-zone’s retail banking markets and found that loan rates respond faster 
to changes in anticipated monetary impulses.  
 
Chong et al (2005) examined the deposit rates of various maturities and 
lending rates of both commercial banks and finance companies in Singapore and 
found that financial institutions adjust their rates upwards more slowly than they 
adjust downwards. They also found that the adjustment speed differs across 
financial products and between banks and finance companies. They did not find 
complete pass-through of interest rates.  
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this paper, we examine both the long-run and short-run pass-through of 
monetary policy rates to various retail interest rates as well as the adjustment 
speed of the short-term dynamics to the long-term equilibrium relationship.  
 
The long-term relationship between the retail interest rate and the 
benchmark market rate is expressed as:  
ttt xy εαα ++= 10                                                            (1)  
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where ty  is the bank lending or deposit rate; tx  represents the 
corresponding policy or money market rate; tε  is the error term; 0α  and 1α   are 
the long-run parameters. The interest rate series are expected to be integrated, 
I(1), variables and the error term is expected to be stationary. As discussed in 
Rousseas (1985), 0α  measures the markup and 1α measures the degree of 
pass-through in the long term. The long-run pass-through is complete if 1α  is 
statistically not different from one.  
 
We estimate equation (1) using the Phillips-Loretan (1991) method. This 
method is well suited to the estimation of long-run relationship involving 
integrated variables where dynamics may play an important role in the DGP 
for ty . It is modeled by the following triangular system of equations: 
ttt uxy 1+′+= βα         (1a) 
tt ux 2=∆ ,         (1b) 
where [ ]′′= ttt uuu 21 is a stationary vector. 
 
Equation (1a) can be estimated using single equation methods, and 
provided that the equation is appropriately augmented, the asymptotic properties 
of the estimator and its distribution can be readily determined. These properties 
hinge on the interrelationships that exist between tu1  and tu2 , which are assumed 
to be stationary.  
 
If the variance-covariance matrix of tu  is block diagonal (so that the 
partitioned elements of the vector do not co-vary) and tu  is also (i.i.d.) then 
equation (1a) can be estimated using least squares.   The estimates will be 
normally distributed, at least asymptotically, and will be equivalent to maximum 
likelihood estimates of the parameters of the system. This result is important as it 
enables statistical inference using standard statistical tables to be used with 
integrated variables.   
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If the variance covariance matrix of tu  is block diagonal but the residuals 
are autocorrelated (but also block diagonal) the regression can be augmented 
with lagged error correction terms, counteracting the autocorrelation of tu1 . This 
solution works because the regressors –xt– are super-exogenous.  They are 
independent of the past and future history of tu1 , i.e. they are orthogonal to 
{ }+∞−∞=ttu1 .  
 
If tu1 and tu2 are correlated one can alleviate the problems that this causes 
by augmenting the regression with leads and lags of tx∆ . One can think of this as 
projecting tu1 against leads and lags of tu2  and then applying the Frisch –Waugh - 
Lovell theorem.  The error from the projection is uncorrelated with tu2 , and the 
endogeneity or contemporaneity problem is thus dealt with.  The inclusion of 
leads eliminates feedback from tu1 back to tu2  and it is important for valid 
conditioning.  The basic problem is that, a priori, we do not know whether 
tu1 correlates with leads of tu2 or vice versa.  
 
The inclusion of two-sided lag differences eliminates the endogeneity problem, 
while the autocorrelation problem may need to be remedied by including lags of 
the error correction term too.  Phillips and Loretan then estimate the following 
equation using least squares: 
( ) tL
li
iti
K
k
ktktktt xdxydxy 12
1
1 νββα +∆+′−+′+= ∑∑
−=
−
=
−−    
 (1c) 
Phillips and Loretan demonstrate that the parameter estimates from 
estimating this single equation are equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation 
of the system and hence are efficient.  Furthermore, the parameters are 
asymptotically unbiased and normally distributed. In contrast, the OLS estimator 
of (1) while superconsistent is not asymptotically unbiased or normally distributed 
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and its finite sample bias may be large and persistent. An added advantage of 
considering the specification given by (1c) is that it accounts explicitly for the role 
of past policy surprises and future expected policy settings in the relationship 
between retail rates and policy instruments. 
 
Equation (1) is a long run model. As monetary policy rate changes, banks 
will not adjust their retail rates immediately. Short-term rates are expected to be 
adjusted more quickly than medium and long-term rates since the latter depend 
on future short-term rates as well as current short-term rates.   
 
To examine the short-run dynamics of interest rate changes in response to 
changes in the policy or money market rates, we employ a structural error-
correction methodology that explicitly models contemporaneous changes in the 
policy variable. The error-correction (ECM) representation corresponding to a 
general ADL(p,q) model is given by: 
 tit
p
i
iit
q
i
itttot yxBxyxy νααδβ +∆Γ+∆+−−+∆=∆ −
=
−
=
−− ∑∑
11
1101 )(                               (2) 
where ∆  denotes first difference operator; 1ˆ −tε = )( 1101 −− −− tt xy αα  
represents the extent of disequilibrium at time ( )1−t  and it is the residual of the 
long run relationship given by Equation (1); and tν  is the error term. oβ  
measures the contemporaneous or impact pass-through rate; iB  and iΓ  are 
dynamic adjustment coefficients; and δ captures the error correction adjustment 
speed when the rates are away from their equilibrium level. The sign of δ is 
expected to be negative due to the mean-reverting nature of interest rates. The 
same type of equation may be specified to describe the dynamics of adjustment 
in the policy rate ( tx∆ ). 
 
The mean adjustment lag (MAL) of a complete pass-through for a general 
ADL(p,q) model or its equivalent ECM parameterization, can be calculated using 
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the formula given in Hendry (1995).  For the special case of an ADL(1,1) model, 
this simplifies to: 
δβ /)1( −= oMAL                                                      (3) 
The MAL is simply the weighted average of all lags and it is a measure of 
the speed with which retails rates respond to movements in policy rates. 
 
Several studies have shown that the short-term adjustment may be asymmetric, 
in other words, the adjustment speed may differ when rates are above the 
equilibrium from that when rates are below (see Chong et al, 2005 and Scholnick, 
1996). To test for the existence of asymmetric adjustments in the retail rates in 
New Zealand, we add a dummy variable,λ , to Equation (2). λ  is equal to one if 
the residual, 1ˆ −tε , is positive and 0 otherwise. The asymmetric short-run dynamic 
equation is as follows: 
 tit
p
i
iit
q
i
itttot yxBxy ηελδελδβ +∆Γ+∆+−++∆=∆ −
=
−
=
−− ∑∑
11
1312 ˆ)1(ˆ                              (4) 
where 2δ  captures the error correction adjustment speed when the rates 
are above their equilibrium values and 3δ  captures the error correction 
adjustment speed when the rates are below their equilibrium values. To test for 
the existence of asymmetric adjustment, we use the standard Wald test to 
determine if 2δ  is significantly different from 3δ . 
 
 As with the symmetric adjustment case, we can define the asymmetric 
mean adjustment lags (MAL) of a complete pass-through using the formula in 
Hendry (1995). For the special case of an ADL(1,1) model, this is given by: 
20 /)1( δβ −=+MAL       (5) 
30 /)1( δβ −=−MAL       (6) 
where +MAL  represents the mean adjustment lag when the retail interest 
rates are above their equilibrium value and −MAL  represents the mean 
adjustment lag when the retail interest  rates are below their equilibrium value.  
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V. DATA AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
Data 
We use monthly series of interest rate data from two sources. The fixed 
mortgage rates of maturities of one to three years are obtained from a major 
commercial bank in New Zealand and the rest of the data, namely, the base 
lending rate, the floating mortgage rate and the six-month time deposit rate, the 
OCR and the overnight interbank rate, are all from the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand. The sampling period is from August 1994 to December 2004, covering 
a time span of over 10 years. The sample size is 125 for most interest rate 
series.  
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample data. Panel A 
shows that descriptive statistics for the whole sample and Panel B shows those 
for the subsample after the OCR was introduced which covers the period March 
1999 to December 2004.  The average fixed mortgage rates are positively related 
with maturity, indicating an upward sloping yield curve.  Panel B also shows that 
the standard deviation of interest rates in New Zealand has decreased 
substantially with the introduction of OCR. Previously, the monthly volatility of 
interest rates was much higher, more than 1 percent for most series, with the 
overnight interbank rate having the highest monthly volatility at 1.72 percent.   
After the OCR was introduced, interest rates became much more stable than 
before, the monthly volatility of all the rates declined to the range of 0.6 to 0.75 
percent. 
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Panel A:  The whole sample covering the period 1994:8 – 2004:12 
* Starting from March 1999 when it was first implemented. 
 
Panel B:  The after-OCR subsample covering the period 1999:3 – 2004:12 (No. 
of Obs. = 70) 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The pair-wise correlation coefficients between the various interest rates 
are reported in Table 2. The OCR is shown to be highly correlated with the 
floating mortgage rate, the time deposit rate and base lending rate, but less 
correlated with the fixed rate mortgages. The OCR is also highly correlated with 
the overnight interbank rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Series 
 
Mean  Median
 Maximum  
 Minimum 
 
Std.Dev.
OCR        5.43            5.38           6.50           4.50        0.63 
Interbank        5.44           5.53           6.50           4.07        0.64 
Floating_rate         7.49           7.58           8.77           6.50        0.68 
Fixed_1YR        6.91           6.85           9.25           5.90        0.65 
Fixed_2YR        7.27           7.15           8.70           6.25        0.59 
Fixed_3YR        7.55           7.50           8.80           6.30        0.61 
Base_lending        9.70           9.88         11.09           8.36        0.75 
Time_deposit (6MTH)        5.31           5.25           6.70           4.27        0.62 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev  Obs.
OCR*       5.54        5.50       6.50       4.50       0.65  70
Interbank       6.54        6.15     10.00       3.30       1.72  125
Floating_rate        8.67        8.44     11.50       6.50       1.56  125
Fixed_1YR       8.04        7.50     11.50       5.90       1.49  125
Fixed_2YR       8.27        7.95     11.50       6.25       1.30  125
Fixed_3YR       8.41        8.25     11.50       6.30       1.17  125
Base_lending     10.55      10.36     12.75       8.36       1.24  125
Time_deposit 
(6MTH) 
      6.39        6.20       9.17       4.15       1.45  125
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  OCR* Interbank 
Floating_
rate 
Fixed_
1YR 
Fixed_
2YR 
Fixed_ 
3YR 
Base_  
lending  
Interbank 
   
.984              
Floating_ 
rate 
   
0.981     0.975            
Fixed_ 
1YR 
   
0.677     0.912     0.938          
Fixed_ 
2YR 
   
0.385     0.856     0.888  
   
0.981        
Fixed_ 
3YR 
   
0.230     0.814     0.844  
   
0.959  
   
0.990      
Base_  
lending  
   
0.931     0.952     0.973  
   
0.863  
   
0.796  
   
0.744    
Time_  
deposit 
   
0.931     0.972     0.984  
   
0.960  
   
0.918  
   
0.880  
   
0.941  
* Starting from March 1999 when it was first implemented. 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients 
 
Stationarity and Cointegration Tests 
Before carrying out cointegration tests, we need to determine whether the 
individual interest rate series are unit root processes and (thus) their first-
difference are stationary series. We test the null hypothesis of unit root against 
the alternative hypothesis of stationarity using the Phillips-Perron (PP) and the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedures. The results of the stationarity tests 
on the various interest rate series are summarized in Table 3.  For the level of the 
series, the results show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that all the series 
are unit root non-stationary at the 1% level of significance, and that all the first 
differenced series are stationary at the 1% level of significance, except for OCR 
whose first differenced series is stationary at the 5% level for the ADF test.   
 
The results of the cointegration tests are reported in Table 4. The 
Johansen’s Trace test is used.  The results of the Johansen tests show that that 
all retail series are cointegrated with the interbank rate.iv  
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Phillips-Perron test   
Level First difference 
Series Prob. Bandwidth Obs Series Prob. Bandwidth Obs
OCR 33.5% 5 69 D(OCR) 0.0% 4 68 
Interbank 29.5% 6 124 D(Interbank) 0.0% 2 123
Floating_Rate 36.3% 6 124 D(Floating_Rate) 0.0% 2 123
Fixed_1YR 32.3% 3 124 D(Fixed_1YR) 0.0% 1 123
Fixed_2YR 32.1% 2 124 D(Fixed_2YR) 0.0% 3 123
Fixed_3YR 31.6% 1 124 D(Fixed_3YR) 0.0% 3 123
Base_lending 26.4% 6 124 D(Base_lending) 0.0% 2 123
Time_deposit 37.1% 7 124 D(Time_deposit) 0.0% 3 123
 
ADF test  
Level 1st difference 
Series Prob. Lag  
Max 
Lag Obs Series Prob. Lag  
Max 
Lag Obs
OCR 6.1% 2 10 67 D(OCR) 3.2% 1 10 67 
Interbank 28.2% 1 12 123 D(Interbank) 0.0% 0 12 123
Floating_Rate 14.8% 2 12 122 D(Floating_Rate) 0.0% 1 12 122
Fixed_1YR 48.5% 0 12 124 D(Fixed_1YR) 0.0% 0 12 123
Fixed_2YR 45.7% 0 12 124 D(Fixed_2YR) 0.0% 0 12 123
Fixed_3YR 38.6% 0 12 124 D(Fixed_3YR) 0.0% 0 12 123
Base_lending 20.3% 1 12 123 D(Base_lending) 0.0% 0 12 123
Time_deposit 21.7% 1 12 123 D(Time_deposit) 0.0% 0 12 123
 
Table 3: Unit Root Tests 
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Cointegration 
of series (y) 
with interbank 
rate(x) 
(Normalised) 
Cointegrating 
Vector 
Series      r=0      r≤1  (1, -α1, αo) 
Floating_rate          
 
15.79     4.84 
   (.051)   
(.302) 
(1, -0.91, -
2.71) 
 
Fixed_1YR             
 
19.48    5.39 
   (.064)   
(.243) 
(1, -0.82, -
2.64)   
 
Fixed_2YR          
 
   21.61     5.53 
 (.045)    (.230)
(1, -0.69, -
3.69) 
 
Fixed_3YR            
                                       
   21.53     5.48 
  (.033)    
(.235) 
(1, -0.61, -
4.39) 
 
Base_lending  
 
14.78   5.12 
  (.064)   (.024) 
(1, -0.61, -
6.53) 
 
Time_deposit  
 
24.56   6.59 
   (.012)  (.150) 
(1, -0.84, -
0.85) 
 
 
Numbers in brackets are MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
  
Table 4: Johansen cointegration rank test (trace) results ( ttt xy εαα ++= 10 ) 
 
 
Long-Term Pass-Through and Structural Change 
 Having established that the overnight interbank interest rate is cointegrated with 
the various retail interest rates, we then estimate the long-term pass-through for 
the whole sample. The results of both Phillips-Loretan estimator and the OLS 
estimator are reported in Table 5. Our results show that the Phillips-Loretan 
estimates can differ quite substantially in some cases from the OLS estimates. 
Hence, the OLS results, especially t-values, should be interpreted with caution. 
On the other hand, from Tables 4 and 5 we can see that the Phillips-Loretan 
estimates are quite similar to those obtained by using the bivariate (VAR) 
Johansen model specification.v 
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Over the entire sampling period, the χ2 test statistic and p-values in the 
last two columns of Table 5 results show that the long-term pass-through is 
incomplete for all the series except the floating and fixed one-year mortgage rate 
at the 5 percent level. The slope coefficients are in the range of 58.8% to 93.4% 
(pass-through). In general, the degree of long-term pass-through is higher for 
short-term retail interest rates than that for longer-term rates. This is consistent 
with the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. As the 
OCR is an overnight rate, it is more highly correlated with short-term rates than 
with long-term rates. Long-term rates are influenced not only by current short-
term rates but also future short-term rates.  
 
Notes: RHS Variable (x) is interbank rate. The degree of pass-through is measured by the slope, 1α .  
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
Numbers in brackets are t-ratios of estimated coefficients (the null hypothesis is: 1α =0); all estimates and 
statistics are computed using the Phillips-Loretan method unless otherwise stated. χ2( 1α =1) is the test statistic 
for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is equal to one (complete pass-through). DW values for OLS 
regressions (not reported here) are quite low indicating the presence of serial correlation and possibly 
misspecified (omitted) dynamics. 
 
Table 5: Long-run Pass through (Phillips-Loretan Estimates) ( ttt xy εαα ++= 10 ) 
Dependent 
Variable (y) 
Constant 
 
Constant 
(OLS)  
Slope 
 
Slope 
(OLS) 
R2 
 
DW 
 
χ2( 1α =1) Prob.
Floating_rate 
 
2.498* 
(6.033) 
 
2.094* 
(11.258) 
0.934*
(15.056)
 
1.004* 
(29.529)
0.978 
 
1.826 
 
1.127 0.289
Fixed_1YR 
 
2.780* 
(3.720) 
 
3.648* 
(6.775) 
0.793*
(7.051)
 
0.621* 
(6.402) 
0.954 
 
1.964 
 
3.374 0.066
Fixed_2YR 
 
3.742* 
(4.953) 
 
5.772* 
(9.717) 
0.686*
(6.015)
 
  0.297* 
(2.776) 
0.943 
 
1.976 
 
7.713* 0.006
Fixed_3YR 
 
4.511* 
(5.236) 
 
6.857* 
(11.390) 
0.588*
(4.532)
 
   0.147 
(1.349) 
0.922 
 
2.026 
 
10.043* 0.001
Base_lending 
 
3.825* 
(2.440) 
 
4.098* 
(15.701) 
0.761*
(9.598)
 
 1.035* 
(22.021)
0.989 
 
1.929 
 
9.105* 0.002
Time_deposit 
 
0.957* 
(2.688) 
 
  0.445 
 (1.503) 
0.825*
(15.350)
 
0.907* 
(17.113)
0.991 
 
1.981 
 
10.669* 0.001
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Since the shift to OCR in March 1999 represented a major change in New 
Zealand monetary policy, we test next if there is a structural change associated 
with the introduction of the new policy instrument. The standard dummy-variable 
test is used to test the stability of the constant and slope coefficients of Equation 
1. The dummy variable (D) takes on the value of zero between August 1994 and 
February 1999 (i.e., prior to the introduction of OCR) and the value of one 
between March 1999 and December 2004 (i.e., after its introduction). The test 
results on long-term pass-through are reported in Table 6. 
 
 Constant Slope Dummy (D) Slope Dummy 
(D*x) 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Floating_rate 5.021 8.478* 0.629 8.720* -2.690 -3.831* 0.322 2.944* 
Fixed_1YR 4.141 3.613* 0.646 4.632* -0.199 0.128 -0.086 -0.341 
Fixed_2YR 5.018 3.220* 0.537 2.818* 1.471 0.855 -0.371 -1.341 
Fixed_3YR 5.162 3.497* 0.526 2.911* 1.272 0.714 -0.304 -1.070 
Base-lending 6.126 6.655* 0.674 6.020* -1.586 -2.054* 0.278 2.410* 
Time_deposit 2.983 5.794* 0.593 9.492* -2.053 -3.002* 0.216 1.954** 
 
Notes: D is a dummy variable. D = 0 for observations before March 1999 and 1 otherwise.   
The column under the heading “Slope Dummy” measure the changes in the long-term pass through 
after the introduction of the OCR regime. 
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level; ** indicates significance at 10 percent. 
 
Table 6: Structural Change (Phillips-Loretan estimates)  ( tttt xDDxy εαααα ++++= *3210 ) 
 
The results show that prior to the introduction of OCR in 1999, the long-
term degree of pass-through for all series was in the range of 52.6% to 67.4%, 
none of which is complete. In comparison, after the introduction of OCR, the 
degree of pass-through for the floating mortgage rate, the base lending rate and 
the 6-month deposit rate increased, but that for the fixed 1-3 year mortgage rates 
did not change significantly (at least not statistically). In fact the degree of pass 
through is statistically complete for the floating and base rates at the 5 percent 
level and for the 6-month deposit rate at the 10 percent level (the p-values for 
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testing the hypothesis that the sum of the slope coefficients is equal to 1 in Table 
6 are 0.653, 0.746 and 0.087 for the floating, base lending and 6-month deposit 
rate equations, respectively). 
 
The increase in the long-term pass-through from official to retail rates is 
probably due to less interest rate volatility and more transparency and 
competition in the marketplace. After the introduction of OCR, interest rates, as 
expected, became much less volatile, as shown in Table 1. With more stable 
interest rates, we would expect bank interest rate adjustment costs to decrease 
and hence a higher degree of pass-through. In addition, with the introduction of 
OCR, there has been more transparency in the way policy is set and 
communicated to the financial markets resulting in more competition in the 
banking industry. Kleimeier and Sander (2005) also show that greater 
transparency in the conduct of monetary policy can increase the degree of long-
term pass-through. 
 
While the increased transparency in monetary policy and the subsequent 
decrease in volatility can explain the increase in the degree of long-term pass-
through for floating interest rates and fixed deposit rates, it had no impact on the 
fixed mortgage rates. One possible reason is the heavy reliance of New Zealand 
banks on foreign borrowing.   
 
Due to the negative savings rate of the household sector in New Zealand, 
banks and other types of financial institutions in New Zealand actively source 
their funding globally, in Eurodollar markets and the US money market in 
particular. A mixture of instruments such as bank loans, Euro commercial paper, 
medium term notes (MTNs) and bonds are used. In theory, the substantial 
amount of overseas borrowing should not render monetary policy in New Zealand 
less effective if banks effectively hedge against the currency risk in the foreign 
currency debt. By swapping it into fixed or floating domestic currency (i.e., New 
Zealand dollars) through foreign exchange (FX) swaps and cross currency 
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interest rate swaps, the effective borrowing cost overseas would be about the 
same as that of domestic interest rate with the same maturity, ignoring 
transaction costs associated with the hedge. In this case, banks are borrowing 
synthetically from overseas. Under interest rate parity, changes in domestic 
interest rates would be reflected in the funding cost. If FX risk hedging is not 
done, then borrowing from overseas would have significant impact on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in the country due to the leakage. In practice, 
short-term FX risk can be hedged easily through FX swaps, currency swaps, 
hedging against longer-term currency risk is more costly and less effective, 
reducing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. Further, if hedging is 
done using options, currency volatility as well as domestic interest rate can affect 
the hedging cost and hence the true funding cost, influencing the effectiveness of 
monetary policy on retail rates. Our results suggest that the longer term FX risk 
may not be hedged effectively in New Zealand. 
 
Short-Term Pass-Through and Adjustment Speed 
We use bivariate specifications of structural-error-correction (SEC) models to 
estimate the short-run dynamics of adjustment of retail interest rates and 
benchmark wholesale rates. The results of the retail interest rate adjustment are 
reported in Table 7. We only report the estimates for the impact and error 
correction coefficients. Coefficient estimates for the other variables in the retail 
interest rate equations and the results of the interbank rate equations are not 
reported but are available upon request. All the parameters have the expected 
sign and are statistically significant. The impact pass-through coefficients, βo, are 
positive and statistically significant. For fixed rate mortgages, the 
contemporaneous pass-through, ranges from 35.3% for the base lending rate to 
86.2% for the 1-year fixed rate. All the estimates of error correction speed or 
adjustment speed,δ , are negative and statistically significant, indicating that the 
retail rates mean-revert to their long-run equilibrium values. The mean 
adjustment lags show a similar picture. It only takes less than a month for 1-year 
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fixed rates to complete on average their adjustment but takes close to 4 months 
for the three-year fixed rate mortgages to go through the same process.  
 
Series βo t-value δ t-value MAL  
Floating_rate   
0.415  
 1.87** -0.321  -3.74*    
0.94  
Fixed _1YR   
0.862  
 4.20*  -0.216  -3.14*    
0.64  
Fixed _2YR   
0.480  
 2.09*  -0.154  -2.76*    
1.75  
Fixed _3YR   
0.486  
 2.49*  -0.138  -2.53*    
3.79  
Base_lending   
0.353  
 6.46 * -0.153   -3.11 
* 
3.24  
Time_deposit   
0.829  
 8.50 * -0.237  -3.54 *   
0.72  
MAL = mean adjustment lag  (see Hendry 1995) 
significant at 5% level; ** significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 7: Short-term pass-through and adjustment speed (SEC estimates) 
( ttit
i
iit
i
it yxy ηεδγβ ++∆+∆=∆ −−− ∑∑ 1ˆ ) 
 
The short-term retail rates, e.g, the one-year fixed rate and the six-month 
time deposit rate show both greater degree of short-term pass-through and 
speedier adjustment. Banks have been known to compete intensely in these 
segments and more so under the OCR regime. Residential mortgages are very 
important for New Zealand banks. Over the past few years, they account for over 
50 percent of all banks’ loan portfolio. For some banks, it accounts for over 70 
percent of their total loans and advances. In order to gain market share of 
residential mortgage, banks have been competing intensely with each other, 
especially in the short-term fixed rate mortgage market.vi  Competition for 
deposits is also very keen. As discussed earlier, the rate of savings in New 
Zealand is among the lowest in the industrialized countries and banks have to 
borrow a large amount of wholesale funds from overseas to finance their loan 
growth. Domestic deposits are preferable as they are more stable and less 
sensitive to changes in interest rates.  
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Asymmetric Adjustment Speed 
We estimate structural error-correction models that allow for different speed of 
adjustment towards equilibrium. The results on the asymmetric adjustment 
models are reported in Table 8. Comparing the asymmetric adjustment speed 
coefficients, δ2 and δ3, there is no evidence of asymmetric adjustment speed for 
any of the retail interest rates. We also estimated the impact of the introduction 
OCR on the asymmetric adjustment speed, there is no statistically significant 
difference either.  There is some evidence to suggest that a differential speed of 
adjustment may exist for the base lending rate but the results are not conclusive.  
We also investigated the possibility that bank adjusted rates upwards at a 
different speed than adjusting them downwards during the post OCR period but 
there was no conclusive evidence to suggest that this is indeed the case. There 
was some weak evidence again that banks adjust rates faster upwards for base 
lending rates post OCR and also that they adjust rates faster downwards for the 
1-year fixed rate. The latter result may be indicative of the intense competition 
that is taking place among banks in recent years for market share in this 
particular market segment. 
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Series βo δ2 δ3 χ2 
(δ1=δ2)) 
MAL+ MAL- 
Floating_rate 
 
  
0.411** 
(1.760) 
 - 
0.324* 
  (3.118)
-0.314* 
(2.381) 
0.004 
 
0.94 
 
0.97 
 
Fixed 1YR 
 
 0.802* 
(4.112) 
 -0.220* 
 (2.517) 
- 0.296** 
(1.928) 
0.182 
 
0.90 
 
0.67 
 
Fixed 2YR 
 
0.479* 
 (2.076) 
-0.162* 
(2.156) 
- 0.144** 
(1.684) 
0.026 
 
1.70 
 
1.81 
 
Fixed 3YR 
 
0.483* 
(2.461) 
-0.145* 
(2.041) 
-0.126 
(1.402) 
0.027 
 
3.55 
 
4.09 
 
Base_lending 
 
0.391* 
(9.922) 
-0.108; 
(1.426) 
-0.214* 
(2.774) 
0.823 
 
7.84 
 
3.95 
 
Time_deposit  
0.825* 
(8.331) 
-.0.248* 
(2.923) 
 -.0.219* 
(2.058) 
0.049 
 
0.70 
 
0.80 
 
Notes: T-value in brackets. *significant at 5% level; ** significant at 10% level. 
D is a dummy variable. D = 0 for observations before March 1999 and 1 otherwise.   
Under the asymmetric ECM, MAL+ represents the mean adjustment lag when the retail rates are 
above their equilibrium value and MAL- represents the mean adjustment lag when the retail rates 
are below their equilibrium value. βo measures the degree of pass-through in the short-term. 
 
Table 8: Short-term pass-through and asymmetric adjustment speed (SEC 
estimates) (A: tttit
i
iit
i
it yxy ηελδελδγβ +−++∆+∆=∆ −−−− ∑∑ 1312 ˆ)1(ˆ ) 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have examined the following issues: Firstly, we considered the 
long-term pass through of various retail interest rates including mortgage rates of 
different maturities. Secondly, we examined the short-term pass-through and the 
adjustment speed of those retail interest rates using an error correction and test 
whether the adjustment is symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, we investigated 
whether a change in monetary policy operating procedures as a result of the 
adoption of the Official Cash Rate (OCR) instrument in 1999 has had a different 
effect on the pass-through and adjustment speed of interest rates in New 
Zealand.  
 
Our findings show that the long-term pass-through of retail rates varies 
across financial products. Short-term rates show a higher degree of pass-through 
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and faster adjustment speed than long-term rates, but there is no evidence of 
significant asymmetric adjustment. We also find that the introduction of OCR is 
associated with an increase in the pass-through for floating and deposit rates but 
not for fixed mortgage rates. The latter result suggests that in a small open 
economy with a substantial amount of overseas borrowing the effectiveness of 
monetary policy may be weakened.  
 
Overall, our results show that monetary policy rate has more influence on 
short-term interest rates. We also find evidence suggesting that increased 
transparency in the conduct of monetary policy has reduced the volatility of 
official policy rates and led to more competition in the banking industry. As 
monetary policy transparency increases and interest rate volatility decreases, 
future short-term rate changes become less uncertain, thereby enhancing the 
degree of pass-through of official rates to retail rates in tandem with the efficacy 
of monetary policy.   
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NOTES 
 
1 The New Zealand financial system is dominated by banks. Bank assets account for 76% of the 
total assets of the financial system. Foreign own banks dominate the banking system. 98% of 
bank assets are owned by foreign banks, mostly Australian banks (RBNZ, 2005).  
2 OCR is typically reviewed at the release of the Reserve Bank’s quarterly Monetary Policy 
Statements and about halfway between each Monetary Policy Statement. Unscheduled 
adjustments to the OCR are made only in exceptional circumstances. For example, OCR was 
adjusted shortly after the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. 
3 This is in contrast to the volatile experience with the MCI where markets, particularly those 
offshore, had at times difficulties reading the signals of policy. 
4 We assessed whether the overnight interbank can be used as a proxy of monetary policy 
stance. We adopt a two step procedure. First, we test the relationship between the two series 
over the period between March 1999 and December 2004. We find that the two series cointegrate 
using a Johansen test and that the slope coefficient has an estimated value of .99 which is 
insignificantly different from one (Johansen cointegrating restriction χ2 test p-value=.19). 
Secondly, we estimate the long-term relationship between OCR and the various retail interest 
rates over the same period. We also estimate the long-term relationship between the overnight 
interbank interest rate and the various retail rates over the same period. The results are very 
similar using either the OCR or the overnight rate, indicating that the overnight interbank rate can 
be used as a proxy for the monetary policy stance, which is a common practice in the literature 
(Chong et al, 2005).  To test for robustness, we also used the 90 T-bill rate as an alternative 
measure of the market benchmark rate. The results are similar to those of using the interbank 
rate.  
5 It is possible that the finite bias of the OLS estimator may be less or negligible compared to the 
other two estimators for floating and possibly base-lending rates to the extent that there are no 
dynamics in the DGP for those interest rates (as banks typically adjust them in full after a policy 
change) and switching or menu costs are unimportant. 
6As at March 2005, about 25% of mortgages are priced on a floating rate basis and 75% on a 
fixed rate basis. Among the fixed rate mortgages, 30% out of the 75% is fixed for up to one-year, 
35% fixed for one to two year,  and only 10% are for the remaining fixed terms (i.e., three and 
five-year fixed rates).  
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